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VIRGINIA SECTION 
NOTE. 
"The Issue of Marriages Deemed Null in Law '~ * * 
Shall Nevertheless Be Legitimate" 
So, in effect, wrote Thomas Jefferson as a member of a committee 
appointed in 1776 by the General Assembly of Virginia to prepare 
changes in the existing legal system. It became law in Virginia in 
1785 as section 17 of the law of descent.1 It is one of the first Ameri-
1. For a detailed history of the origin and development of this statute in 
Virginia, see Withrow v. Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S. E. (2d) 343 (1943). 
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can statutes designed to ameliorate the unfortunate status of illegitmate 
children at common law, and has been widely copied.2 Since it is a 
well-known rule of statutory interpretation that a construction given 
a statute by the state of its origin is impliedly adopted by the legisla-
ture of a state which subsequently itself adopts the statute, the Vir-
ginia cases are of quite general interest. The tendency of the times 
is shown by the increase in the number of such statutes, and greater 
liberality in their interpretation. Although such statutes are in dero-
gation of the common law they are generally held to be remedial in 
their nature and are therefore usually construed liberally to accom-
plish the beneficent purpose for which intended.3 Since these enact-
ments are frequently a part of the intestate laws of the State (as in 
Virginia) a strict interpretation would lead to the unfortunate result 
that the issue of void marriages would be legitimate only for the pur-
pose of inheritance. That this is clearly not the law is shown by the 
fact that the Supreme Court of Appeals in Virginia has considered 
this statute for the purposes of determining whether the plaintiffs 
were "children" within the meaning of a clause in a will devising prop-
erty to trustees for the use of A and B for their joint lives, and if 
either should die without children, the whole for the use of the sur-
vivor for life. and at his death to the children of the survivor in fee,4 
whether or not the father owed a duty to support such issue,5 and 
whether or not the issue of such a marriage are children of the father 
within the meaning of death-by-wrongful-act statutes.6 
But what is a "void marriage" and what is the distinction between 
"no marriage" and a "void marriage"? In Virginia four types of 
marriages have been held void without decree: ( 1) bigamous mar-
riages; 7 (2) marriages between a white person and a colored per-
son; 8 (3) marriages knowingly made to any person who has been 
lawfully adjudged to be insane, epileptic or feebleminded and duly 
admitted as a patient or inmate in any State hospital or colony; 9 and, 
2. By "at least three States in the Union-Kentucky, Ohio, and Arkan-
sas," Mr. Justice Hudgins in Withrow v. Edwards, supra, note 1. As of Jan-
uary 1, 1931, there were twenty-three American junsdictions having such a 
statute. See 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMII.Y LAws (1931,) § 48. At least 
two States have adopted a similar statute since that date; GA. CoDE ANN. 
(Park. et al., 1936) tit. 53, § 104; KAN. GEN. STAt. ANN. (Corrick, 1935) 
c. 23, § 124. The apparent discrepancy between the above estimates may be 
due in part to variations in the wording of the statutes. 
3. '"These statutes are remedial in. their nature and should be liberally con-
strued," Goodman v. Goodman, 150 Va. 42, 142 S. E. 412 (1928). While this 
seems obvious, there is authority that such statutes should be strictly con-
strued. See Holmes v. Adams, llO Me. 167, 85 Atl. 492 (1912), where it 
was held that a Nevada statute legitimating the issue of void marriages did 
not entitle such issue to inherit through their parents but only from their 
parents. 
4. Greenhow v. James, 80 Va. 636 (1885). 
5. McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, 180 Va. 51, 21 S. E. (2d) 761 (1942). 
6. Withrow v. Edwards, supra, note 1. · 
7. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1942) § 5087. 
8. !d. 
9. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1942) § 5088b. But marriages prohibited be-
cause of consanguinity or affinity, or because of insanity (where there has 
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( 4) common law marriages.10 
According to some authorities a bigamous ceremonial marriage 
must have been entered into honestly and in good faith by at least 
one of the parties for the statute to apply. Otherwise, it is argued, 
there is no marriage at all-not even a void one.U Yet most (but 
not all) of the statutes say nothing about the good faith of the parties, 
and if the statute makes no such requirement a decision insisting on 
good faith is contrary not only to the letter but to the spirit of the 
statute which is obviously designed to protect the "innocent and un-
offending" offspring. The idea that the crime of bigamy, or even 
that of miscegenation, can be eliminated by stigmatizing the children 
of such marriages is simply absurd, for people who are so infatuated 
with each other that 'they are willing to commit a felony by contracting 
an illegal marriage \vill not be deterred on the one hand, or encouraged 
on the other hand, by the thought that possible issue may be illegiti-
mate or legitmate. It just is not "cricket" to punish the children 
for the crimes of their parents.12 Fortunately, however, there are a 
number of decisions which either ignore any question of good faitl1 
or expressly repudiate that requirement.13 For example, in the 
Virginia case of Goodman v. Goodman 14 a child was born before the 
marriage of the parents, who subsequently contracted a void bigamous 
marriage. The father, both before and after the void marriage, rec-
ognized the child as his own. Under a statute providing for the 
legitimation of bastards by recognition and the subsequent intermar-
riage of their parents,15 it was held that the subsequent marriage need 
not be a valid marriage, and hence the child born before such void 
marriage was entitled to inherit from the father to the exclusion of 
the father's brothers.16 
If the marriage is void because miscegenous 17 there is a sharp con-
flict of authority as to whether or not the issue are legitimate. The 
leading Virginia case is Greenhaw v. James 18 where one Dade Hooe, 
a white man, cohabited with one Hannah Greenhow, a colored woman, 
for upwards of forty years and until his death. There were eleven 
children borne of this illicit union. The parties were legally married 
been no adjudication) are not per se void, VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1942) § 
5088. 
10. Offield v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 40 S. E. 910 (1902). 
11. Stripe v. Meffert, 287 Mo. 366, 229 S. W. 762 (1921). 
12. Cf. the problem as to whether or not the negligence of a parent should 
be imputed to the child. The New York case of Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 
615 (N. Y. 1839) so holding is now clearly the minority rule. See Warren 
v. Manchester St. Ry., 70 N. H. 352, 47 At!. 735 (1900), and R.!lsTAttMENT, 
ToRts (1934) § 488. 
13. Requirement of good faith expressly repudiated in Harris v. Harris, 
85 Ky. 49, 2 S. W. 549 (1887). For collection of cases, see 84 A. L. R. 501-
505 (1933). 
14. Sttpra, note 3. 
15. VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1942) § 5269. 
16. Contra: Adams v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N. E. 260 (1891). 
17. Although Kentucky adopted the Virginia statute, miscegenous mar-
riages are excepted from its operation. KY. R.!lv. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 
1943) § 391.100. 
18. Supra, note 4; and see Stones v. Keeling, 5 Call. 143 (Va. 1804). 
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in the District of Columbia for the express purpose of legitimating 
the children. This marriage, of course, was void in Virginia, which 
was at all tlmes the matrimonial domicile of the parties. By a three-
to-two decision the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that 
even if the children should be regarded as issue of the marriage, the 
statute legitimating the issue of void marriages had no application to 
miscegenous marriages since such marriages were not in contempla-
tion of the legislature at the time the act was passed in 1785. It is 
submitted that the minority of the court were right. The statute does 
not distinguish between void miscegenous marriages and void biga-
mous marriages. At that time, just as it is now, bigamy was punished 
more severely than miscegenation.19 It would be just as logical to 
hold that the rest of the statute of descent did not apply to Negroes 
because the legislature did not have them in mind in 1785. If Negroes 
acquire a new status, and the legislature keeps the old laws, it would 
seem that it was the intention of the legislature that the Negro should 
come under the old laws still in force, for better or for worse, until 
changed by the legislature. 
The leading case in conflict with Greenhow v. James 20 is Re At-
kins,21 in which an Indian man married a Negro woman in Oklahoma 
where such marriages were absolutely void. It was held (two of mine 
judges dissenting) that issue of the marriage were legitimate. "In 
the mind of this simple red man these children were his children." 22 
In such cases there is no reasonable doubt as to the usual intentions 
of the deceased intestate. It is the primary purpose of the intestate 
laws to carry out that intention-not to defeat it. And since such 
intention was given effect in Re Atkins, supra, the decision in that 
case was eminently proper. To allow the intestate's property to go 
to his collateral relatives under such circumstances is as unnatural as 
the miscegenous marriage itself. 
The legitimacy of the issue of common law marriages in States 
where such marriages are void have been held to be legitimate in 
States having the statute under discussion.23 It has been contended 
that the statute applied only to void ceremonial marriages, but one 
looks in vain for any such limitation in the statute, and the decisions 
holding the issue legitimate clearly carry out the intentions of the 
Legislature in enacting the statute, and are to be commended.24 One 
of the commonest cases to arise, however, is that in which parties who 
know of some impediment to the marriage, and know of the serious 
19. At that time miscegenation was punishable by confinement in the pen-
itentiary from two to five years, and bigamy from three to eight years; now 
miscegenation is from one to five years and bigamy is still from three to 
eight years. Sec Acts of 1877-8, pp. 301-2 (Virginia), and VA. CoDE ANN. 
(Michie, 1942) §§ 4938 and 4546. 
20. Supra note 4. 
21. 151 Okla. 294, 3 P. (2d) 682 (1931). 
22. Mr. Justice Cullison in his majority opinion. Rc Atkins, supra, note 20. 
23. Font v. Hanlin, 113 W. Va. 752, 169 S. E. 743 (1933); McClaugherty 
v. McClaugherty, supra, note 5. 
24. Sec Note (1929) 29 CoL. L. RE\", 839. on Kester v. Kester, 106 W. Va. 
615, 146 S. E. 625 (1929). 
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criminal penalty which may attend such a marriage, live together as 
man and wife without getting married. Here, unfortunately, the 
cases hold unanimously that meretricious cohabitation is not even a 
void marriage. Issue are said to be born "clear out of wedlock." 
"The legislature did not attempt to make concubinage marriage."-2;; 
Now no one contends the marriage is legal, or that the parties are 
husband and wife. But why do we not have a void common law 
marriage in these cases? Are the children of such unions to be pun-
ished merely because their parents preferred to commit a misdemeanor 
(e. g., living in adultery), rather than a felony (e. g., bigamy) ? Is 
not a void common law marriage a void marriage? Should we draw 
petty distinctions between a void marriage, a voidable marriage, and 
no marriage at all, to the injury of the issue? It is submitted that 
where the parties have cohabited as man and wife and there is no rea-
sonable doubt as to the paternity of the issue, then such issue should 
be held to be legitimated by the statute. This would exclude the case 
of the issue of promiscuous intercourse, not for the purpose of dis-
couraging such intercourse, or for the purpose of punishing such issue, 
but because in such cases there is serious doubt as to the identity of 
the father and, even if the latter be established, it is not clear whether 
or not the father would presumably wish such issue to be regarded as 
his children and heirs at law. 
A great many involved questions have arisen with reference to 
such statutes in the realm of conflict of laws.2 6 Two illustrative cases 
will suffice for present purposes. In re Bruington's Estate 21 actually 
held that a child born and domiciled in New Jersey and legitimated 
there under the New Jersey statute was not a legitimate child en-
titled to realty of an intestate in New York on the ground that a 
New Jersey statute could not make the issue of a bigamous marriage 
legitimate in New York. On the other hand, in the Virginia case of 
Witlzrow v. Edwards,28 a child of a bigamous marriage was born in 
South Carolina where there is no legitimating statute. The parents 
moved to Virginia. The father was ki1led in an automobile accident 
and the question arose as to whether or not the child was legitimate 
and hence a child of the father under the Virginia death-by-wrongful-
act statute.29 The court properly held that the child was entitled to 
the sum recovered. It repudiated the theory that illegitimacy is a 
fixed, permanent status. The decision can be supported on three 
distinct grounds : ( 1) That Virginia as an incident to -its sovereignty 
has the right to determine the status of its citizens, and under the 
statute legitimating children of void marriages, ,it is immaterial where 
the void marriage took place; (2) the statute at the very least is a 
statute of descent and means that the child is legitimate for the pur-
25. See Differari v. Terry, 128 Tex. 521, 99 S. W. (2d) 290 (1936). 
26. For an able discussion of this subject, see Note, Legitimation of tlze 
Issue of Invalid Marriages in the Conflict of Laws (1937) 46 YALE L. Jot_:R. 
1049. 
27. 160 Misc. 34, 289 N. Y. Supp. n5 (Surr. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1936). 
28. Supra, note 1. 
29. VA. Com: ANN. (Michie, 1942) §§ 5786-5788. 
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pose of inheritance, whatever may be its status in other places or 
for other purposes ; and ( 3) the word ''children" in death by wrong-
ful act statutes is not limited to legitimate children only.30 The con-
clusion to be drawn from these two cases is that in the interest of 
justice, where the law of more than one state is involved the law of 
the state most favorable to legitimacy should be applied.31 
D. W. Woodbridge.* 
vVILLIAMsBuRc, VA. 
30. See Middleton v. Luckenback S. S. Co., 70 F. (Zd) 326 (C. C. A. Zd, 
1934) (wrongful death in collision on high seas), commented upon in (1934) 
21 VA. L. REv. 120. 
31. See Legitimatio11 of the Issue of Invalid Marriages i11 the Conflict of 
Laws, loc. cit. sttPra, note 26. ' 
*Professor of Law, College of William and :Mary. 
